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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 





NEW MEXICO BUREAU OF 
REVENUE 
/3 from NM Ct App (Wood, 
~ernandez, Andrews) 
State/Civil Timely 
SUMMARY: A.ppts arque that the state was l::eemptM from 
taxing the gross receipts of a construction comoanv hired by the •• L...:_:_:..:.;;,.--......._ 
Navajo Indians to build a school on its reservation. 
FACTS: ~he Navaio Indians received more than $9 million from 
Congress to build a school on their reservation. Appts note that -construction of the school was necessary bP.cause the state closed 
a public high school in 1968, forcing Navajo youth to attend a 
federal boarding school. The money was disbursed through the 
w/ ey(J fu ll.ot~ Vu{t1 te 1-t-ell-(A AJ lh ''st t j F ~t-aci:ef, 
~ 
b"f'L 
. ., - 2 -
Bureau of Indian Affairs. The scho61 board entered into a cost-
plus contract with appt Lembke Construction Company, a non-Indian 
company, which required the board to reimburse Lembke for anv 
taxes. New Mexico collected about $232,000 in taxes on Lembke's 
gross receipts. ~he Navaios claim this has prevented completion 
of the school facilities. 
DECISION BELOW: The~M Ct. of Apo. affirmed a trial court's 
decision that the state had authority to tax the construction 
company's gross receipts. The court's reasoning was that the 
legal incidence of the tax was on Lembke rather than the Navaios. 
It relied upon Mescalero Apache Tribe v. O'Cheskev, 625 F.2d 967 
(lOth Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3619 (Feb. 23, 1981). 
In O'Cheskey a divided CAlO en bane upheld New Mexico's authority 
to collect its gross receipts tax from a contractor building a 
hotel and recreational facility on a reservation. The NM Ct. of 
App. denied a motion for a rehearing to consider this Court's 
decisions i~Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 
448 u.s. 160 (1980), and ~hite Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 
448 u.s. 136 (1980). The NM Sup. Ct. granted a writ of 
certiorari but then quashed it as improvidently granted. 
CONTENTIONS: Appts argue that New Mexico is preempted from 
taxing the gross receipts of the construction project because the 
tax conflicts with a comprehensive federal scheme to accomplish a 
major national goal, the improvement of Indian education. Appts 
point to the 1868 Navajo Treaty which obligated the federal 
government to provide schools and a 1969 congressional report 
that termed Indian education "a national tragedy." They further 
argue that a necessary implication of the congressional 
appropriations directing the BIA to provide a school for the 
- 3 -
Navajos is that the appropriations were for construction costs 
and not for paying state taxes. And under Bracker, appts argue, 
the state is preempted from collecting its tax because of the 
pervasive federal involvement in the proiect. Appts term the NM 
Ct. of App.'s reliance on the "legal incidence" of fhe tax "a 
mechanical application of a discredited labeling test •••• " 
Resp contends that Bracker is distinguishable because the 
federal involvement was more comprehensive. Bracker involved 
logging on a reservatjon, for which there are detailed federal 
regulations, unlike construction of school buildings. And in 
Bracker the state tax was levied on a contractor who operated 
exclusively on a reservation while Lembke constructs buildings 
..../ 
throughout New ' Mexico. Resp finds O'Cheskey on point and 
persuasive. It notes that the Apache resort considered in that 
case was constructed with funds appropriated by Congress and 
administered bv the Economic Development Administration. It also 
notes that Congress knows how to specifically designate 
appropriations that the states may not tax and argues that 
Congress either intended to allow New Mexico to tax the 
appropriation for the Navaio school or had no intent on the 
issue. 
DISCUSSIO s ated that to determine whether a state 
may on a reservation a court must make "a ... ' (. ., 
particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and ------.... ~ 
tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine 
whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority 
would violate federal law." 448 U.S. at 145. The New Mexico 
courts have not made a particularized inquiry but have instead 





incidence of the tax. Such an approach, endorsed by CAlO in 
O'Cheskey, seems contrary to Bracker. ~he SG argued that the 
Court should grant cert in O'Cheskey because application of a 
legal incidence test gives no attention to federal and tribal 
interests. The federal ann tribal interests involved in this 
case, Indian education, would appear to be at least as strong as 
the interests involved in Bracker, logging on a reservation, and 
much stronger than the interests involved in O'Cheskev, 
construction of a resort. 
I recommend CVSG with an eye toward NPJ or perhaps a summary 
reversal. 
~here is a response. 
8/31/81 Wright Op in Petn 
The Navajo argue in reply tha comprehensive federal 
regulations do cover this project Moreover preemption may be 
invoked here in any event. The ate tax frustrates the federal 
purpose of improving Indian educ tion. Since the N~ty 
has been found to preempt a ·~~e~ax--McClanahan v. 
Arizona, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)-- rely it must also preempt a state 
tax which burdens an objective explicitly stated in the treaty: 
education of the Navajo. 
I don't think that McCl nahan is directly on point since the 
state tax here is levie on the construction company--not the 
tribe. But there is co si rable strength to their argument that 
existence vel non of "co ehensive federal regulations" is not 
the only way to determin the federal intention to preempt. 
The SG "reluctantly" urges the Court to note jurisdiction or grant 
cert in this case. The courts below did not follow Bracker or Central 
Machinery. ~
The SG suggests tha summary treatmegt will not be enough here. The 
state courts are sim ly ignoring ~decisions of this Court. Moreover, 
the court of appeals 1 purp~to distinguish Bracker and Wkixe 
M~HHXRiH Central Machinery. 
Could we still GVR xRxxi~kxx~f for further consideration in light of 
Bracker and Central Machinery? I think that is still the best course 
rather than a full blown grant. 
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Memorandum to Justice Powell 
Bobtail memo on No. 80-2162, Ramah Navajo 
Two years ago, you wrote separately in two cases. 
That writing provides relevant guideposts for deciding this 
case. 
In Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 
U.S. 160 (1980), a company that had no license to trade with 
Indians and no place of business on the reservation entered 
the reservation to make a single sale of farm machinery. 
The Court (TM writing) held that Arizona could not tax that 
sale. You dissented, stressing that the single sale did not 
interfere with the statutory plan that Congress set up to 
govern such transactions: 
"Since a seller not licensed to trade with the 
Indians must secure specific federal approval 
for each isolated transaction, there is no 
danger that ordinary state business taxes will 
imparin the Bureau [of Indian Affair's] abili-
ty to prevent fraudulent or excessive 
pricing." Id., at 173. 
In this course of this reasoning you quoted language stating that 
taxes will not be invalidated if they do not "to a substantial 
extent frustrate the evident congressional purpose " Id. 
2. 
In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 
(1980), the Court held that Arizona could not collect gas tax and 
a gross receipts tax from a motor carrier operating on an Indian 
reservation. You agreed, stating that the carrier's "daily oper-
ations are controlled by a comprehensive federal regulatory 
scheme designed to assure the Indian tribe the greatest possible 
return from their timber." !d., at 174. 
I gather from these expressions that the key inquiry is 
whether a state tax substantially impairs comprehensive federal 
regulatory scheme benefitting Indians. If so, then the state tax 
is preempted. This is in accord with general principles of pre-
emption, with the caveat that federal preemption in the Indian 
field will be found somewhat more readily than otherwise. See 
White Mountain Apache, 448 u.s., at 143 (opinion of TM). 
Applying these principles to this case, I conclude Indi- U4H•'4 
ans should win this fairly close case. The SG lists the two rel- ~ -
evant federal statutes at pages 13-126 of his brief. These stat-
~ ' ~ ~ 
utes authorize federal grants for the purpose of funding Indian 
-----------------~~ 
education. As part of this purpose, they also specify that the 
--., 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) will review and monitor school 
construction agreements. The regulations and BIA review in this 
case made no provision for payment of state taxes. The SG's ba-
--------~~--------~---------------~ 
sic argument is that, in the absence of explicit federal approval 
of such a state tax, its payment will have the simple effect of 
reducing the funds available to further the central federal pur-
pose: education of Indian children. 
3. 
In response, New Mexico makes two central arguments. 
Its strongest is that calculations that included provisions for 
the NM tax formed the basis for estimates upon which Congress 
based its award of Ramah Navajo construction funds. This is a 
potentially powerful argument. I think it would win if NM were 
able to show that Congress had any actual knowledge that the es-
timates included state taxes, or had Congress expressed any in-
tent to devote federal funds to the payment of state taxes. NM 
fails, however, to make these showings. I understand their argu-
ment to be only that the Ramah Board assumed at first that it 
would have to pay the tax, that the Board submitted its estimate 
totals to Congress, and that Congress approved an award. Appar-
ently at no point did the federal government have any actual 
knowledge that the grant was designed to include sums devoted to 
NM taxes. Under these circumstances, I believe that the Indians 
have the better argument that extraction of the taxes will reduce 
a federal grant that Congress did not intend to have reduced by 
the payment of state taxes. I do note, however, that reasonable 
minds certainly could differ on this point. 
The State • s second argument is that the federal scheme 
makes provision for state provision of Indian schooling in some 
instances. The State concludes that collection of the state tax 
cannot interfere with the federal scheme. This argument is es-
sentially irrelevant, it seems to me, because this is nQt a situ-
ation in which the State has agreed to undertake the burdens of 
4. 
participating in Indian education. If so, this would be a dif-
ferent case if it had -- a point that I believe the SG concedes. 
In conclusion, I think the Indians have succeeded in 
demonstrating that the federal Indian education statutes and reg-
ulations have the goal of maximizing Indian educational opportu-
nities by means of federal grants. The purpose of this fairly 
comprehensive federal scheme is infringed to a degree by the pay-
ment of state taxes out of the federal grant. Although I do not 
think that the argument is an overwhelming one, on balance I be-
lieve that the NM tax is preempted by federal law. 
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From: Justice Marshall 
Circulated: MAY 2 ) 1 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-2162 
RAMA~I NAVAJO SCHOOL BOARD, INC., ET AL., 
APPELLANTS v. BUREAU OF REVENUE OF 
NEW MEXICO 
APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW MEXICO 
[June - , 1982) 
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case, we address the question whether federal law 
pre-empts a state tax imposed on the gross receipts that a 
non-Indian construction company receives from a tribal 
school board for the construction of a school for Indian chil-
dren on the reservation. The New Mexico Court of Appeals 
held that the gross receipts tax imposed by the State of New 
Mexico was permissible. Because the decision below is in-
consistent with White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 
448 U. S. 136 (1980) (White Mountain), we reverse. 
I 
Approximately 2,000 members of the Ramah Navajo Chap-
ter of the Navajo Indian Tribe live on tribal trust and allot-
ment lands located in west central New Mexico. Ramah N a-
vajo children attended a small public high school near the 
reservation until the State closed this facility in 1968. Be-
cause there were no other public high schools reasonably 
close to the reservation, the Ramah Navajo children were 
forced either to abandon their high school education or to at-
tend federal Indian boa~·ding schools far from the reserva-
tion. In 1970, the Ramah Navajo Chapter exercised its au-
thority under Navajo Tribal Code, Title 10, §51, and 









2 RAMAH NAVAJO SCH. BD. v. BUREAU OF REVENUE 
ation. Appellant Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc. (the 
Board) was organized as a nonprofit corporation to be oper-
ated exclusively by members of the Ramah Navajo Chapter. 
The Board is a Navajo "tribal organization" within the mean-
ing of 25 U. S. C. § 450b(c), 88 Stat. 2204. With funds pro-
vided by the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the 
Navajo Indian Tribe, the Board operated a school in the 
abandoned public school facility, thus creating the first inde-
pendent Indian school in modern times. 1 
In 1972, the Board successfully solicited from Congress 
funds for the design of new school facilities. Pub. L. 92-369, 
86 Stat. 510. The Board then contracted with the BIA for 
the design 'of the new school and hired an architect. In 1974, 
the Board contracted with the BIA for the actual construc-
tion of the new school to be built on reservation land. Fund-
ing for the construction of this facility was provided by a se-
ries of congressional appropriations specifically earmarked 
for this purpose. 2 The contract specified that the Board was 
the design and building contractor for the project, but that 
the Board could subcontract the actual construction work to 
third parties. The contract furthered provided that any sub-
contracting agreement would have to include certain clauses 
governing pricing, wages, bonding, and the like, and that it 
must by approved by the BIA. 
The Board then solicited bids from area building contrac-
tors for the construction of the school, and received bids from 
'On July 8, 1970, in his Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, 
President Nixon referred specifically to these efforts of the Board to as-
sume responsibility for the education of tribal children abandoned by the 
State as a "notable example" of Indian self-determination. 6 Weekly 
Comp. of Pres. Doc. 894, 899 (1970). 
2 See Pub. L. 93-245, 87 Stat. 1073 (1973) (amending Pub. L. 93-120, 87 
Stat. 431 (1973) to specifically earmark funds appropriated there for the 
construction of the Ramah school facility); Pub. L. 93-404, 88 Stat. 810 
(1974); Pub. L. 94-165, 89 Stat. 985 (1975); Pub. L. 95-74, 91 Stat. 293 
(1977). 
80-2162-0PINION 
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two non-Indian firms. Each firm included the state gross re-
ceipts tax as a cost of construction in their bids, although the 
tax was not itemized separately. Appellant Lembke Con-
struction Company (Lembke) was the low bidder and was 
awarded the contract. The contract between the Board and 
Lembke provides that Lembke is to pay all "taxes required 
by law." Lembke began construction of the school facilities 
in 1974 and continued this work for over five years. During 
that time, Lembke paid the gross receipts tax and, pursuant 
to standard industry practice, was reimbursed by the Board 
for the full amount paid. Before the second contract be-
tween Lembke and the Board was executed in 1977, a clause 
was insert'ed into the contract recognizing that the Board 
could litigate the validity of this tax and was entitled to any 
refund. 
Both Lembke and the Board protested the imposition of 
the gross receipts tax. In 1979, after exhausting adminis-
trative remedies, they filed this refund action against appel-
lee New Mexico Bureau of Revenue in the New Mexico Dis-
trict Court. At the time of trial, the parties stipulated that 
the Board had reimbursed Lembke for tax payments of 
$232,264.38 and that the Board would receive any refund that 
might be awarded. 
The trial court entered judgment for the State Bureau of 
Revenue. After noting that the "legal incidence" of the tax 
fell on the non-Indian construction firm, the court rejected 
appellants' arguments that the tax was pre-empted by com-
prehensive federal regulation and that it imposed an imper-
missible burden on tribal sovereignty. The Court of Appeals 
for the State of New Mexico affirmed. Although ackno\vl-
edging that the economic burden of the tax fell on the Board, 
the Court of Appeals concluded that the tax was not pre-
empted by federal law and that it did not unlawfully burden 
tribal sovereignty. Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc . v. 
Bureau of Revenue, State of New Mexico, 95 N.M. 708, 625 
P. 2d 1225 (N.M. App. 1980), cert. quashed, 96 N.M. 17, 627 
80-2162-0PINION 
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P. 2d 412 (1981). The Board filed a petition for rehearing in 
light of this Court's intervening decisions in White Mountain, 
supTa, and Centml Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax 
Comm., 448 U. S. 160 (1980). The Court of Appeals denied 
the petition, stating only that this case did not involve either 
"a comprehensive or pervasive scheme of federal regulation" 
or "federal regulation similar to the Indian trader statutes." 
*[Cite if published]. After initially granting discretionary 
review, the New Mexico Supreme Court quashed the writ as 
improvidently granted. 96 N.M. 17, 627 P. 2d 412 (1981). 
We noted probable jurisdiction. -- U. S. --. 
II 
In recent years, this Court has often confronted the diffi-
cult problem of reconciling "the plenary power of the States 
over residents within their borders with the semi-autono-
mous status of Indians living on tribal reservations." 
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U. S. 
164, 165 (1973). Although there is no definitive formula for 
resolving the question whether a State may exercise its au-
thority over tribal members or reservation activities, we 
have recently identified the relevant federal, tribal, and state 
interests to be considered in determining whether a particu-
lar exercise of state authority violates federal law. See 
White Mountain, 448 U. S., at 141-145. 
A 
In White Mountain, we recognized that the federal and 
""-. 
tribal interests a?ise from the broad power of Congress to 
regulate tribal affairs under the Indian Commerce Clause, 
Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and from the semi-autonomous status of In-
dian Tribes. 448 U. S., at 142. These interests tend to 
erect two "independent but related" barriers to the exercise 
of state authority over commercial activity on an Indian res-
ervation: state authority may be pre-empted by federal law, 
80-2162-0PINION 
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or it may interfere with the Tribe's ability to exercise its sov-
ereign functions. Ibid. (citing, inter alia, WaTren Tmding 
Post Co. v. A1-izona Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685 (1965); 
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, supra; and Wil-
liams . S. 217 (1959)). As we explained in 
e two barriers are independent because either, 
standing alone, can be a sufficient basis for holding state 
law inapplicable to activity undertaken on the reserva-
tion or by tribal members. They are related, however, 
in two important ways. The right of tribal self-govern-
ment i.s ultimately dependent on and subject to the broad 
power of Congress. Even so, traditional notions of In-
dian self-government are so deeply engrained in our ju-
risprudence that they have provided an important "back-
drop," ... against which vague or ambiguous federal 
enactments must always be measured." I d., at 143 
(quoting McClanahan v. A1-izona State Tax Comm'n, 
supra, at 172). 
The State's interest in exercising its regulatory a1,1thority _ ' 
over the activity in question m'ust be examined and given ap-
propriate weight. Pre-emption analysis in this area is not 
controlled by "mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or 
tribal sovereignty;" it requires a particularized examination 
of the relevant state, federal, and tribal interests. I d., at 
145. The question whether federal law, which reflects the 
related federal and tribal interests, pre-empts the State's ex-
ercise of its regulatory authority is not controlled by stand-
ards of pre-emption developed in other areas. I d., at 
143-144. Instead, the traditional notions of tribal sover-
eignty, and the recognition and encouragement of this sover-
eignty in congressional Acts promoting tribal independence 
and economic development, inform the pre-emption analysis 
that governs this inquiry. See id., at 143 and n. 10. Rele-
vant federal statutes and treaties must be examined in light 
80-2162-0PINION 
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of "the broad policies that underlie them and the notions of 
sovereignty that have developed from historical traditions of 
tribal independence." I d., at 144-145. As a result, ambigu-
ities in federal law should be construed generously, and fed-
eral pre-emption is not limited to those situations where Con-
gress has explicitly announced an intention to pre-empt state 
activity. Id., at 143-144, 150-151. 
In White Mountain, we applied these principles and held 
that federal law pre-empted application of the state motor 
carrier license and use fuel taxes to a non-Indian logging com-
pany's activity on tribal land. We found the federal regula-
tory scheme for harvesting Indian timber to be so pervasive 
that it precluded the imposition of additional burdens by the 
relevant state taxes. I d., at 148. The Secretary of the In-
terior (Secretary) had promulgated detailed regulations for 
the purpose of developing "'Indian forests by the Indian peo-
ple for the purpose of promoting self-sustaining communi-
ties."' Id., at 147 (quoting 25 CFR § 141.3(a)(3) (1979)) . 
Under these regulations, the BIA was involved in virtually 
every aspect of the produc.tion and marketing of Indian tim-
ber. Id., at 145-148. In particular, the Secretary and the . ', ,.,,.,' 
BIA extensively regulated the contractual relationship be-
tween the Indians and the non-Indians working on the res-
ervation: they established the bidding procedure, set manda-
tory terms to be included in every contract, and required that 
all contracts be approved by the Secretary. Id., at 147. 
We found that the the state taxes in question would 
"threaten the overriding federal objective of guaranteeing 
Indians that they will 'receive ... the benefit of whatever 
profit [the forest] is capable of yielding ... . "' I d., at 149 
(quoting 25 CFR § 141.3(a)(3) (1979)). We concluded that 
the imposition of state taxes would also undermine the Secre-
tary's ability to carry out his obligations to set fees and rates 
for the harvesting and sale of the timber, and it would impede 
the "Tribe's ability to comply with the sustained-yield man-
agement policies imposed by federal law." Id., at 149-150. 
,, I 
I 
, I I II I I 1 ~ _. 
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Balanced against this intrusion into the federal scheme, the 
State asserted only "a general desire to raise revenue" as its 
justification for imposing the taxes. I d., at 150. In this 
context, this interest is insufficient to justify the State's in-
trusion into a sphere so heavily regulated by the Federal 
Government. Ibid. 
B 
This case is indistinguishable in all relevant respects from 
White Mountain. Federal regulation of the construction and 
financing of Indian educational institutions is both compre-
hensive and pervasive. The Federal Government's concern 
with the education of Indian children can be traced back to 
the first treaties between the United States and the Navajo 
Tribe. 3 Since that time, Congress has enacted numerous 
statutes empowering the BIA to provide for Indian education 
both on and off the reservation. See, e. g., Snyder Act, 42 
Stat. 208, 25 U. S. C. § 13 (1921); Johnson-O'Malley Act, 48 
Stat. 596, 25 U. S. C. § 452 et seq. (1934); Navajo-Hopi Re-
habilitation Act, 64 Stat. 44, 25 U. S. C. § 631 et seq. (1950); 
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 88 
Stat. 2203, 25 U. S. C. § 450 et seq. (1975) (Self-Determina-
tion Act). Although the early focus of the federal efforts in 
this area concentrated on providing federal or state educa-
tional facilities for Indian children, in the early 1970's the fed-
eral policy shifted toward encouraging the development of In-
dian-controlled institutions on the reservation. See 6 
Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 894, 899-900 (Message of Pres. 
Nixon) 
This federal policy has been codified in the Indian Financ-
ing Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 77, 25 U. S. C. § 1451 et seq., and 
3 Article VI of the 1868 Treaty between the United States and the Na-
vajo Tribe, 15 Stat. 669, provides that "[i]n order to insure the civilization 
of the Indians entering into this treaty, the necessity of education is 
admitted." 
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most notably in the Self-Determination Act. The Self-
Determination Act declares that a "major national goal of the 
United States is to provide the quantity and quality of educa-
tional services and opportunities which will permit Indian 
children to compete and excel in the life areas of their choice, 
and to achieve the measure of self-determination essential to 
their social and economic well-being." 88 Stat. 2003, as set 
forth in 25 U. S. C. 450a(c). In achieving this goal, Con-
gress expressly recognized that "parental and community 
control of the educational process is of crucial importance to 
the Indian people." 88 Stat. 2003, as set forth in 25 U. S. C. 
§ 450(b)(3). 
Section 450k empowers the Secretary to promulgate regu-
lations to accomplish the purposes of the Act. 88 Stat. 2212, 
25 U. S. C. § 450k. Pursuant to this authority, the Secre-
tary ha~ promulgated detailed and comprehensive regula-
tions respecting "school construction for previously private 
schools now controlled and operated by tribes or tribally ap-
proved Indian organizations." 25 CFR § 27 4.1 (1975). 
Under these regulations, the BIA has wide-ranging authority 
to monitor and review the subcontracting agreements be-
tween the Indian organization, which is viewed as the gen-
eral contractor, and the non-Indian firm that actually con-
structs the facilities. See 25 CFR § 27 4. 2 (1975). 4 
Specifically, the BIA must conduct preliminary on-site in-
spections, and prepare cost estimates for the project in co-
operation with the tribal organization. 25 CFR § 274.22 
(1975). The Board must approve any architectural or engi-
'Although these regulations did not become effective until several 
n,, ths after the BIA and the Board had executed the initial contracts, the 
Se-:> · tary and the BIA had applied similar requirements under the author-
ity of the Johnson-O'Malley Act, 48 Stat. 496, 25 U. S. C. § 452 et seq. In 
any event, the two subsequent agreements between the BIA, the Board 
and Lembke, accounting for two-thirds of the total construction, were 
signed after the effective date of these regulations, which clearly authorize 
the BIA to monitor these construction agreements. 
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neering agreements executed in connection with the project. 
25 CFR § 274.32(c) (1975). In addition, the regulations em-
power the BIA to require that all subcontracting agreements 
contain certain terms, ranging from clauses relating to bond-
ing and pay scales, 41 CFR § 14H-70.632 (1975), to preferen-
tial treatment for Indian workers. 25 CFR § 274.38 (1975). 
Finally, to ensure that the Tribe is fulfilling its statutory ob-
ligations, the regulations require the tribal organization to 
maintain records for the Secretary's inspection. 25 CFR 
§ 274.41 (1975). 
This detailed regulatory scheme governing the construc-
tion of autonomous Indian educational facilities is at least as 
comprehensive as the federal scheme found to be pre-emptive 
in White Mountain. The direction and supervision provided 
by the Federal Government for the construction of Indian 
schools leaves no room for the additional burden sought to be 
imposed by the State through its taxation of the gross re-
ceipts paid to Lembke by the Board. This burden, although 
nominally falling on the non-Indian contractor, necessarily 
impedes the clearly expressed federal interest in promoting 
the "quality and quantity" of educational opportunities for In-
dians by depleting the funds available for the construction of 
Indian schools. 6 
• The Bureau invites us to adopt the "legal incidence" test, under which 
the legal incidence and not the actual burden of the tax would control the 
pre-emption inquiry. Of course, in some contexts, the fact that the legal 
incidence of the tax falls on a non-Indian is significant. See Washington v. 
Confederated Tribes, 447 U. S. 134, 150--151 (1980); Moe v. Salish & Koote-
nai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463 (1976). However, in White Mountain Apache 
Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 151 (1980), we found it significant that the 
economic burden of the asserted taxes would ultimately fall on the Tribe, 
even though the legal incidence of the tax was on the non-Indian logging 
company. Given the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme at issue 
here, we decline to allow the State to impose additional burdens on the sig-
nificant federal interest in fostering Indian-run educational institutions, 
even if those burdens are imposed indirectly through a tax on a non-Indian 
contractor for work done an the reservation. 
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The Bureau of Revenue argues that imposition of the state 
tax is not pre-empted because the federal statutes and regu-
lations do not specifically express the intention to pre-empt 
this exercise of state authority. This argument is clearly 
foreclosed by our precedents. In White Mountain we flatly 
rejected a similar argument. 448 U. S., at 150- 151 (citing 
Wan·en Trading Post Co. v. A1-izona Tax Comm'n, supra; 
Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217 (1958); and Kenerly v. Dis-
t1-ict Court of Montana, 400 U. S. 423 (1971)). There is 
nothing unique in the nature of a gross receipts tax or in the 
federal laws governing the development of tribal self-suffi-
ciency in the area of education that requires a different 
analysis. ' 
In this case, the State does not seek to assess its tax in re-
turn for the governmental functions it provides to those who 
must bear the burden of paying this tax. Having declined to 
take any responsibility for the education of these Indian chil-
dren, the State is precluded from imposing an additional bur-
den on the comprehensive federal scheme intended to provide 
this education-a scheme which has "left the State with no 
duties or responsibilities." Wan·en Trading Post Co. v. Ari-
zona Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S. at 691. 6 Nor has the State as-
serted any specific, legitimate regulatory interest to justify 
the imposition of its gross receipts tax. The only arguably 
specific interest advanced by the State is that it provides 
services to Lembke for its activities off the reservation. This 
interest, however, is not a legitimate justification for a tax 
6 Of course, these statutes and regulations do not displace the States 
from providing for the education of Indian children within their bound-
aries. Indeed, the Self-Determination Act specifically authorizes the Sec-
retary to enter into contracts with any State willing to construct educa-
tional institutions for Indian children on or near the reservation. 88 Stat. 
2214, 25 U. S. C. § 458. This case would be different if the State were 
actively seeking tax revenues for the purpose of constructing, or assisting 
in the effort to provide, adequate educational facilities for Ramah Navajo 
children. 
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whose ultimate burden falls on the tribal organization. Fur-
thermore, although the State may confer substantial benefits 
on Lembke as a state contractor, we fail to see how these 
benefits can justify a tax imposed on the construction of 
school facilities on tribal lands pursuant to a contract be-
tween the tribal organization and the non-Indian contracting 
firm. 7 The New Mexico gross receipts tax is intended to 
compensate the State for granting "the privilege of engaging 
in business." N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-9-3.F and 7-9-4.A 
(Repl. Pamph. 1980). New Mexico has not explained the 
source of its power to levy such a tax in this case where the 
"privilege of doing business" on an Indian reservation is ex-
clusively oestowed by the Federal Government. 
The State's ultimate justification for imposing this tax 
amounts to nothing more than a general desire to increase 
revenues. This purpose, as we held in White Mountain, 448 
U. S., at 150, is insufficient to justify the additional burdens 
imposed by the tax on the comprehensive federal scheme 
regulating the creation and maintenance of educational 
opportunities for Indian children and on the express federal 
policy of encouraging Indian self-sufficiency in the area of 
education. 8 This regulatory scheme precludes any state tax 
7 In Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 U. S. 160 
(1980), we held that the Indian trader statutes, 19 Stat. 200, 25 U. S. C. 
§ 261 et seq., pre-empted the State's jurisdiction to tax the sale of farm ma-
chinery to the Indian Tribe, notwithstanding the substantial services that 
the State undoubtedly provided to the off-reservation activities of the non-
Indian seller. Presumably, the state tax revenues derived from Lembke's 
off-reservation business activities are adequate to reimburse the State for 
the services it provides to Lembke. 
8 We are similarly unpersuaded by the State's argument that the signifi-
cant services it provides to the Ramah Navajo Indians justify the imposi-
tion of this tax. The State does not suggest that these benefits are in any 
way related to the construction of schools on Indian land. Furthermore, 
the evidence introduced below by the State on this issue is far from clear. 
Although the State does provide services to the Ramah Navajo Indians, it 
receives federal funds for providing some of these services, and the State 
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that "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 
312 u. s. 52, 67 (1941). 
c 
The Solicitor General, in an amicus brief filed on behalf of 
the United States, suggests that we modify our pre-emption 
analysis and rely on the dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 
Art. I, § 8, cl. 3, to hold that on-reservation activities involv-
ing a resident Tribe are presumptively beyond the reach of 
state law even in the absence of comprehensive federal regu-
lation, thus placing the burden on the State to demonstrate 
that its intrusion is either condoned by Congress or justified 
by a compelling need to protect legitimate, specified state in-
terests other than the generalized desire to collect revenue. 
He argues that adopting this approach is preferable for sev-
eral reasons: it would provide guidance to the state courts ad-
dressing these issues, thus reducing the need for our case-by-
case review of these decisions; it would avoid the tension 
created by focusing on the pervasiveness of federal regula-
tion as a principle barrier to State assertions of authority 
when the primary federal goal is to encourage tribal self-
determination and self-government; and it would place a 
higher burden on the State to articulate clearly its particular-
ized interests in taxing the transaction and to demonstrate 
the services it provides in assisting the taxed transaction. 
We do not believe it necessary to adopt this new ap-
proach-the existing pre-emption analysis governing these 
cases is sufficiently sensitive to many of the concerns ex-
pressed by the Solicitor General. Although clearer rules and 
presumptions promote the interest in simplifying litigation, 
our precedents announcing the parameters of pre-emption 
analysis in this area provide sufficient guidance to state 
conceded at trial that it saves approximately $380,000 by not having to pro-
vide education for the Ramah Navajo children. App. 95, 105-106, 108. 
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courts and also allow for more flexible consideration of the 
federal, state, and tribal interests at issue. We have consis-
tently admonished that federal statutes and regulations relat-
ing to Tribes and tribal activities must be "construed gener-
ously in order to comport with . . . traditional notions of 
[Indian] sovereignty and with the federal policy of encourag-
ing tribal independence." White Mountain, supra, 448 
U. S., at 144; see also McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Comm'n, 411 U. S., at 174-175 and n. 13 (1973); Warren 
Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n., 380 U. S., at 
690-691. This guiding principle helps relieve the tension be-
tween emphasizing the pervasiveness of federal regulation 
and the federal policy of encouraging Indian self-determina-
tion. Although we must admit our disappointment that the 
courts below apparently gave short shrift to this principle 
and to our precedents in this area, we cannot and do not pre-
sume that state courts will not follow both the letter and the 
spirit of our decisions in the future . 
III 
In sum, the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme and 
the express federal policy of encouraging tribal self-suffi-
ciency in the area of education preclude the imposition of the 
state gross receipts tax in this case. Accordingly, the judg-
ment of the New Mexico Court of Appeals is reversed, and 
the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent 
with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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